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Equity and efficiency impacts of rural land rental restrictions:  




Abstract: Recognition of the potentially deleterious implications of high inequality of opportunity due to a biased 
asset distribution has led to increased interest in land reforms. However, little attention has been devoted to the 
potential longer-term impacts of the measures used to implement such reforms, despite evidence that, the restrictions 
on land rental in rural areas they imply can have potentially far-reaching consequences. Use of state level data on 
rental restrictions, in conjunction with a nationally representative survey from India suggests that, contrary to their 
original intention, rental restrictions significantly reduce supply of land to the rental market, prevent land access by 





Researchers and policy-makers alike now realize that unequal access to opportunities arising from a skewed 
distribution of assets can be harmful for sustained long-term growth and therefore of concern for researchers 
and policy-makers alike (Aghion et al. 1999, World Bank 2005). In India, given the inequality in the 
distribution of productive assets, in particular land, inherited from colonial times, land reform and land 
policy have occupied a central stage in the policy debates for a long time. Following successful abolition of 
intermediaries immediately after independence, award of property rights to sitting tenants through tenancy 
laws and expropriation with subsequent transfer of ‘above-ceiling land’ from large land owners to small 
farmers were the main mechanisms to improve operational and ownership distribution of land. Although 
initial progress was slow, the country has made significant progress in implementing such policies during 
the 1970s and 1980s when, under both interventions together, rights to almost 10 mn ha of land were 
transferred. This is an impressive quantitative achievement; in fact, the area affected amounts to more than 
three times what was involved in the well-known land reforms of Japan, Korea, and Taiwan together (King 
1977). Moreover, even though in most cases beneficiaries did not receive full ownership rights, studies 
suggest that land reform has helped to reduce poverty while being neutral in terms of efficiency (Besley and 
Burgess 2000), thus helping to make a contribution towards greater equity.  
However, although the historical impact of land reform legislation is undisputed, scholars have increasingly 
questioned the need to continue maintaining restrictions that were put in place to make redistributive land 
reform feasible a few decades ago. The most obvious reason for doubts is that a combination of inertia and 
litigation, together with population pressure and associated land subdivision, has slowed progress in 
transferring land through land reform legislation to a trickle. In the decade since 1995, the average number 
of households who, according to official statistics, received land through land reform amounted to less than 
3,000 per year. A second reason is that the view of land rental as a backward, exploitative and inefficient 
institution that tends to benefit the rich the deficiencies of which can easily be rectified by a benevolent 
bureaucracy may no longer correspond to reality. In fact, with about 15 mn., the number of households 
participating in rental markets in 1999/2000 alone is larger than the total who benefited from land reforms   2 
since independence. If experience from other Asian countries such as China and Vietnam is any guide for 
India, increased availability of non-agricultural employment opportunities implies that land rental markets 
can be expected to positively affect productivity and equity. It also shows that it will often be more 
appropriate for government to reduce the transaction costs associated with land transfers between private 
parties rather than intervene directly.  
If government’s ability to enforce legislation that will help transfer land to the less fortunate is limited and 
markets are not a priori biased against the poor, many well-intentioned land market interventions of the past 
may have outlived their period of usefulness. Indeed, there is now evidence from India suggesting that rental 
restrictions may do more to undermine landlords’ willingness to supply to the rental market and reduce the 
welfare of poor tenants by forcing them to enter informal arrangements in contravention of the rules (Haque 
2001). This is consistent with a significant body of international (largely urban) literature that documents 
and quantifies the undesirable impact of land rental restrictions in India and in other countries in detail. 
However, while all of this anecdotal evidence is suggestive, more detailed quantitative assessment of the 
functioning of rental markets, and in particular the impact of land reform policies on these markets, ideally 
representative at a national level, would be needed to guide the policy debate.  
In this paper we use nationally representative household-data from 1982 and 1999 to assess the ability of 
different groups of producers, in particular the more productive and the landless, to gain access to land 
through market mechanisms. In addition, we explore the impact of rural rental restrictions as one factor that 
increases the costs of market participation on land market functioning and outcomes. To do so, we make use 
of the variation in land reform policies, and the extent to which such policies are implemented, across states 
that arises from the fact that land policy is responsibility of the states rather than the central government. 
Joint analysis of these two issues with a large nation-wide sample allows us to answer broader questions 
concerning the role of land markets in India and derive some interesting conclusions.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section two describes the history of land reforms and tenancy regulations 
in rural India, reviews evidence on the impact of land rental market restrictions and key differences between 
rural and urban land markets, and uses this to lay out a conceptual model and empirical strategy. Section 
three presents the data used and reviews descriptive statistics for policy variables and household 
characteristics. Section four contains econometric results for the production function and different models of 
land rental market participation and discusses the results and their robustness. Section five concludes by 
putting results into context and draw out possible policy implications.  
2. Background and conceptual framework  
Land reform policy, through abolition of intermediaries, imposition of land ceilings, and regulation of 
tenancy contracts, played a key role in India from the moment it started its existence as an independent state. 
In this section we review main elements of land rental and ceiling legislation, the way it was implemented,   3 
and discuss the literature that explored links between such legislation and land market outcomes. We use 
this to develop a conceptual model for households’ land market participation and derive hypotheses that can 
be tested with the data at hand.  
2.1 Origins and nature of rural tenancy restrictions in India  
Under colonial rule, the main goal of India’s land administration system was to obtain government revenue. 
The de facto award of land rights to revenue collectors (zamindars) in large parts of the country has 
consequences that affect development up to this day (Banerjee and Iyer 2004).
1 Given the severity of the 
burden on individual cultivators, agrarian reform was one of the top demands by the Indian National 
Congress. Similar to a number of other countries where the state lacked the power to expropriate land 
owners or the financial means to compensate them, land reform was adopted as part of a redistributive 
agenda that aimed to increase the property rights enjoyed by tenants.
2 Three elements of agrarian reform 
were emphasized, namely (i) abolition of intermediary revenue collectors; (ii) tenancy reform including the 
imposition of rent ceilings and the prohibition of evictions; and (iii) imposition of a ceiling on land holdings 
that could be owned by any individual or family with a forced transfer of any land beyond this limit to small 
cultivators (Mearns 1999). Following independence and the transfer of legal competence on land issues to 
states, significant variation ensued in timing of legislation, its substantive content, and the efforts made to 
ensure implementation of reform across states (Appu 1997). Abolition of intermediaries was tackled swiftly 
and successfully while other elements of the agenda, i.e. ceilings and tenancy reform, encountered 
considerable from landlord interests. In many states, passage of laws was held up to give landlords time to 
“prepare” - leading to spurious subdivisions, eviction of tenants and resumption of self cultivation, or the 
transformation of tenants into wage workers.
3 Below we briefly review the context of and sequencing ceiling 
and tenancy legislation in different states.  
The ceiling legislation imposed after independence (in most cases only in the early 1960s) is widely judged 
to have been ineffective due to high ceilings (often defined in terms of individuals rather than a household), 
exemptions if land was “used productively”, and limited implementation effort. National guidelines adopted 
in 1972 prompted most states to amend their legislation to establish greater consistency and was followed by 
the only period in Indian history when ceiling legislation led to large-scale land transfers.
4 While modalities 
of such transfers, in particular whether and how much beneficiaries had to pay, varied across states, one 
                         
1 The replacement of a system of fixed land rent with revenue collectors, called zamindars, who were empowered to collect as much land revenue as 
they saw fit in 1757, is commonly linked to a deep agrarian crisis that manifested itself in a series of devastating famines, most notably the Bengal 
famine of 1769/70 in which 10 mn. out of a population of 30 mn. were estimated to have died (Maharatna 1994). To reduce the incentives for short-
term overexploitation, the “permanent settlement” of land revenue in 1793 established three types of revenue system, namely (i) the zamindari 
system where revenue administrators were given permanent rights to land and its revenue; (ii) the ryotwari system where arrangements were made 
between individual cultivators and the administration; and (iii) the mahalwari system where revenue arrangements were made with the village. 
2 In countries as diverse as Uganda, Thailand, Egypt, Mexico, and India, rent ceilings and/or award of non-transferable occupancy rights have been 
used to redistribute land resources to occupants in an environment where more far-reaching measures of land reform were politically infeasible. 
3 Using census figures, Appu (1997) estimates that, in order to avoid having to give rights to tenants, landlords evicted about 30 Mn. tenants or about 
one third of the total agriculturally active population. This is paralleled by evidence in other countries where landlords tried -and often succeeded- to 
evict tenants in anticipation of legislation to protect tenants against eviction or limit the rents they would have had to pay (Binswanger et al. 1995).  
4 Almost 95% of the total 7.34 mn acres that had been declared surplus had been identified by 1980 with coverage increasing to 98% by 1985. Of 
these, 5.4 mn. acres were actually distributed to beneficiaries.    4 
element common to most of them is that recipients’ ability to transfer the land thus received to others 
remains restricted.
5  
The main differences in tenancy legislation across states refer to definition of a tenant,
6 the conditions for 
permitting tenancy, the amount of rent than can be charged, and the type of property rights awarded to 
tenants, in particular relating to the circumstances under which landlords can “resume” rented land for 
‘personal cultivation’ and the amount of compensation, if any, which they have to pay. Most states restrict 
the legality of land leasing.
7 Even where leasing is allowed, the rents that can be received by the landlord are 
limited
8 and tenants’ rights are inheritable but contingent on personal cultivation, i.e. can not be legally 
transferred to others through sub-lease arrangements by original tenants. 
While the variations of legislation across states provides ample scope for analyzing the impact of policies on 
observed outcomes, capturing the fine differences in timing, applicability, modalities of implementation, and 
definitions inherent in such legislation, appears difficult if not impossible. Rather than trying to do so, we 
use the share of households who benefited from key policies as an indicator for policy-induced constraints to 
the operation of rental markets. Specifically, we construct for each state the share of households who were 
awarded tenancy rights and the share of ceiling surplus area that was actually transferred to beneficiaries.
9 
As none of the Indian states permit sub-leasing of lands to which tenants had received permanent rights and 
most states also impose restrictions on transfers of land received in the course of implementing ceiling 
legislation, this is an indicator of direct restrictions on the operation of land rental markets. Both figures also 
provide a good proxy for a state government’s level of implementation effort, a variable that is exogenous to 
households’ decisions but that was shown to be of great importance in earlier studies (Banerjee et al. 2002).  
Table 1 provides summary statistics by state for total agricultural area and 1980 population (columns 1 and 
2) as well as our measures of land reform implementation around 1980 (columns 3 and 4).
10 It illustrates that 
the relative emphasis on different types of intervention, and the extent to which such measures were 
                         
5 The states of Punjab, Madhya Pradesh, Andhra Prdaesh, Himachal Pradesh, Haryana, Gujarat, Maharashtra and Karnataka stipulate that 
beneficiaries will gain ownership rights only once they have reimbursed the government for the compensation that had been paid to the original land 
owner, plus in some cases administrative expenses. In Uttar Pradesh, beneficiaries did not receive ownership rights but were instead made permanent 
tenants of the government and any transfer, including sub-leasing, was prohibited. Transfer of land received under ceiling legislation is also 
prohibited in West Bengal, Bihar, Maharashtra and Gujarat, while being subject to a moratorium (of 10, 15, and 20 years after award of full 
ownership rights) in Orissa, Karnataka, and Himachal Pradesh, respectively. 
6 In a number of states including Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Haryana, Punjab, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu, 
the definition of ‘tenant’ does not include sharecroppers, implying that the extent to which they will benefit from protection will depend on local 
discretion. 
7 This includes a complete prohibition of leasing for all except disabled landowners in parts of Andhra Pradesh and in Bihar, Karnataka, Madhya 
Pradesh, Orissa, Uttar Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Kerala and Jammu and Kashmir. Other states (Gujarat, Haryana, Maharashtra, Punjab, Orissa, 
Rajasthan, West Bengal, and the Andhra Part of Andhra Pradesh) permits leasing but make leases heritable and non-transferable with some (Assam, 
Gujarat, Haryana, Maharashtra and Punjab) establishing a right for the renter to purchase the property after some time. 
8 The rent ceiling is defined either in terms of multiples of the land revenue or as a share of output, such as a sixth of output in Gujarat (Kutch area) 
Maharashtra, and Rajasthan (in case the landlord does not provide any inputs), a fifth or fourth of output in AP, Bihar, Rajasthan (if the landlords 
provides inputs), Orissa, Tamil Nadu, and West Bengal (unless the landlord provides capital, manure, and seed in which case the ceiling is half of the 
produce), and a third of the crop in Punjab and Haryana. 
9 We use area rather than beneficiaries because in some cases ceiling surplus land was distributed to a collective entity such as a cooperative so that 
the number of beneficiaries would be misleading. Also, the existence of large discrepancies between the amount of land expropriated and actually 
distributed -which is due to the fact that in some cases land that had been distributed could not occupied by beneficiaries or was taken back after 
some time- led us to focus on land actually distributed.  
10 Wherever available, the level of the respective variables in 1980 and 1998, respectively, is used as a right hand side variable in the regressions.    5 
implemented, varies across states. More than 10% of households received tenancy rights in Kerala, Gujarat, 
West Bengal, and Maharashtra and more than 5% of area was redistributed under ceiling surplus legislation 
in West Bengal, Andhra, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, and UP. Some states (e.g. West Bengal, Maharashtra) 
heavily relied on both measures, others (e.g. Andhra, Rajasthan and UP) focused exclusively on ceiling 
surplus, and some (e.g. Kerala and Gujarat) emphasized tenancy laws. Although the number of tenancy laws 
enacted is, in the absence of more detailed knowledge on content and implementation effort, at best an 
imperfect proxy for the number and severity of restrictions on land rental, it can be useful as a point of 
comparison. We thus include in the mean number of tenancy laws in each state (column 5) from Besley and 
Burgess (2000). One notes that the mean number of laws at any point amounts to 1.5, from no legislation in 
Haryana to more than 4 pieces in Tamil Nadu. However, the correlation between the number of laws and the 
number of tenants who received rights is low (ρ = 0.28), supporting the notion that legal provisions alone 
may have limited impact and that implementation effort makes a perceptible difference.  
Although not differentiated in the table, a more detailed look at the time dimension of these measures allows 
a number of conclusions (Kaushik and Haque 2005): First, land reform has been a major effort; up to 2000, 
land reform laws resulted in the transfer of almost 10 mn ha, 2.5 mn ha under programs to redistribute of 
ceiling surplus land, and 7.35 mn ha under tenancy legislation.
11 Second, after a spurt of land transfers in the 
1970s and 1980s, progress has slowed down considerably; in fact between 1995/96 and 2003/04, i.e. for 
almost a decade, progress in awarding land rights to tenants had come to a complete standstill and the 
increment in ceiling surplus land transferred during the period amounted to only 10,800 ha. The latter 
represents about one tenth of the land declared ceiling surplus, with the remainder being tied up in litigation. 
This suggests not only that further progress in achieving redistribution of ceiling land could be slow -it 
would take almost 90 years to dispose of remaining ceiling surplus cases if the current pace is maintained- 
but also that, by clogging up the court system and preventing it from quickly dispensing justice in other 
urgent matters, the ceiling legislation may impose external effects beyond land rental markets (Moog 
1997).
12  
2.2 Evidence on incidence and impact of tenancy legislation and rent controls  
Even though empirical evidence on the impact of rent ceilings and other forms of tenancy control in rural 
areas is limited, a number of studies have analyzed this issue in urban contexts. In fact, rent control has 
served as a textbook example for policies that can be effective to transfer resources in the short term but will 
be associated with inefficiencies in the medium to long run (Arnott 2003). The key reason, which also 
formed the basis for analytical approaches, is that, by fixing rents below their equilibrium level, rent controls 
                         
11 The amount of land involved is much larger than what was redistributed in other Asian land reforms such as Japan (2 mn has), Korea  (0.58  mn 
has) and Taiwan (0.24 mn has). In terms of total area distributed, this puts India on par with Mexico which, in a much more land-abundant setting, 
and starting in 1917, managed to distribute slightly more than 13 mn ha (Deininger et al. 2002).  
12 In addition to cases related to contestation by landlords, there is an unknown number of instances where beneficiaries were allocated land but were 
either unable to establish effective possession or were subsequently evicted. A field survey to explore this issue in Andhra Pradesh pointed to at least 
20% of beneficiaries who were not able to access the property they had received although the number of those who are able to file court cases calling 
for their (re)instatement is much more limited.    6 
reduce the supply of new housing (or maintenance of existing units) by landlords who face an artificially 
reduced price (Gyourko and Linneman 1990). Rental restrictions would indeed transfer resources from 
landlords to sitting tenants when they are imposed but also make access to rental property for those who 
were not renting when the controls were imposed more difficult (Basu and Emerson 2000). With a constant 
or decreasing number of beneficiaries and an increasing number of new entrants who need to access to land 
through now distorted markets, the social cost of keeping land rental restrictions in place is expected to 
increase over time (Glaeser 2002). As they are generally ill-targeted and also reduce tenant mobility (Munch 
and Svarer 2002), rather crude first-generation rent controls have been replaced by a more flexible and 
sophisticated policy mix in many urban areas of the world (Arnott 1995).
13  
While initial studies were focused on developed countries, the adverse impact of rent restrictions may be as 
significant or even more severe in the developing world. Computing the cost imposed for cities in Ghana, 
Brazil, India, and Egypt, supports the notion that urban rent controls are generally effective in reducing 
rents, by between 4% and 64%,
14 However, benefits were generally ill-targeted and, in most cases, reduced 
significantly by the welfare losses resulting from reduced housing supply. While rent controls or similar 
restrictions may be useful to deal with emergencies in the short term, other policies such as vouchers or 
supply-side incentives are generally believed to have greater long-run potential (Malpezzi and Ball 1991).  
Even though rigorous quantitative analysis of the impact of rent restrictions in rural areas is more limited 
than in urban ones, a general equilibrium model of land leasing supports the notion that, in the presence of 
restrictions on tenancy, landlords will provide less land to tenancy markets, implying less equalization of the 
farm size structure than without this intervention (Conning and Robinson 2005). In addition, the impact of 
rental restrictions in rural areas may be more pronounced than in urban ones for four reasons. First, as 
owners of urban housing stock have less opportunities to revert to self-cultivation (or cultivation with wage 
labor) than rural land owners, the supply of housing to urban markets will be less elastic, and thus the 
negative supply response less pronounced, than in the case of rural land. Evidence of widespread tenant 
evictions as a response to actual or anticipated imposition of tenancy regulations (Appu 1997) supports this 
argument. Second, to the extent that rural rents are defined in kind -often as a share of output- contract terms 
in rural areas will be less flexible than in urban ones, limiting the scope for circumventing such restrictions 
by adjusting rental rates (Basu and Emerson 2000). Third, the rights given to tenants are often non-
transferable and heritable but incomplete (i.e. still requiring them to pay rent to the landlord). This would 
                         
13 Recognition of this fact has led policy-makers to implement a modified set of interventions –most commonly referred to as “tenancy rent controls” 
that would allow unlimited rent increases between tenancies and may include some other provisions to increase returns to landlords, in the hope of 
avoiding some of the negative impacts associated with earlier forms of rent control (Arnott 1997). As even such measures would be subject to the 
deadweight losses associated with rent controls, (Basu and Emerson 2003), the main policy issue boils down to deciding whether potential gains in 
tenure security that can be achieved through such controls will outweigh the deadweight losses of such a policy instrument as well as the costs of 
implementing it (Glaeser 2002, Arnott 2003), an issue that needs to be resolved empirically. 
14 In the cases studied, rent to income ratios decreased from about 20% in uncontrolled regimes to about 10% in controlled ones and in the case 
studies, rent control reduced the price paid by the typical tenant by between 4% and 64%. At the same time, the fact that house price to income ratios 
increase from about 4 in uncontrolled to between 7 and 8 in controlled regimes suggests that rent control does reduce the supply of housing.   7 
reduce both parties’ incentive for making land-related investments.
15 Limits on sub-leasing could also have a 
pronounced impact if, with generational change, original tenants are no longer able to farm the land they 
received in the most efficient way while their offspring may have taken up non-agricultural occupations. 
Finally, in the case of rural (but not urban) land, arrangements for land use or ownership will have a clear 
impact on productive efficiency due to the disincentive effects associated with wage-labor based cultivation 
(Binswanger et al. 1995) and the fact that, if tenancy laws are combined with land ceiling legislation, 
landlords have an incentive to artificially subdivide land that is subsequently left idle. All this would imply 
that the impact of rental restrictions in rural areas will go far beyond the price effects on which the attention 
of the urban literature has focused. It also suggests that, while tenancy legislation and the associated 
restrictions on terms under which land can be transferred in rural areas may have been a good way of 
transferring residual ownership rights, the cost of maintaining such restrictions is likely to increase over 
time. Empirical analysis of their impact on equity, i.e. land access by landless producers as well as 
efficiency of land use at the household level over time will thus be of great interest.  
Although the literature on land reforms in India and beyond is large (Warriner 1969, Thorner 1976, King 
1977, Haque and Singh 1986), an often rather limited emphasis on impact constrains the extent to which it 
can be relied upon to assess the cost-effectiveness of specific interventions and to draw broader policy 
conclusions.
16 Quantitative studies that use a rigorous analytical framework and aim to construct a 
counterfactual have made little effort to explore the -direct or indirect- costs of such reforms. For example, 
analysis of the large-scale registration of sharecroppers in West Bengal after 1978 (Banerjee et al. 2002) 
finds that this policy led to large productivity gains, in line with earlier studies (Lieten 1996, Rawal 2001). 
Although these gains were contingent on massive tenant mobilization at the grassroots level, the immediate 
costs of implementation and the possible longer-term effects due to limited transferability of and 
overlapping property rights over land reform lands are difficult to assess. At an aggregate level, land reforms 
are found to have had a significant impact on poverty reduction but not on productivity (Besley and Burgess 
2000) and a follow-up study based on the same data tentatively concludes that the poverty impact is likely to 
be worth the cost in terms of productivity (Besley et al. 2004).  
Obviously, providing an assessment of the direct costs of implementing land reform will be difficult and 
mainly of historical interest. At the same time, exploring how land rental markets work and to what extent 
they are affected by tenancy restrictions will allow to put the policy debate on land markets in India on a 
more robust empirical footing. Doing so will allow us to draw conclusions as to whether the benefits from 
maintaining restrictions on the functioning of land rental markets are still sufficiently large to outweigh the 
costs of such measures, something that is of clear policy relevance.  
                         
15 The tenant will be unlikely to invest as doing so will result in an immediate increase of the rent whereas investment by the landlord is unlikely as 
part of the benefits will go to the tenant.  
16 Successive generations of IAS officers in the Lal Bahadur Shastri National Academy of Administration in Mussoorie have made a significant 
contribution to the area by conducting case studies of land reform implementation in almost all of India’s states that have thus far resulted in the 
publication of 10 volumes on the subject that are replete with empirical evidence.    8 
2.3 Conceptual framework  
A key rationale for households to engage in land markets is the desire to adjust for differences in their 
existing endowments of land and family labor. Following similar models in the literature (Carter and Yao 
2002), let household i be endowed with fixed amounts of labor ( i L ) and land ( i A ), and a given level of 
agricultural ability ( i α ). Relative land scarcity, together with the cost of supervising labor (Frisvold 1994) 
makes wage-labor based cultivation undesirable in equilibrium (Binswanger et al. 1995), implying that 
households allocate their labor endowment between farming their own land and off-farm employment at an 
exogenous wage ( i w ).Renting of land incurs three main types of transaction costs (T
in or T
out), that include 
three key elements, namely (i) the need to acquire information on market conditions; (ii) the need to 
negotiate and enforce payments; and (iii) the transaction costs imposed by rental regulations that restrict 
transferability or completely outlaw certain contract types. While the first is more akin to a fixed cost, the 
other two elements, which make up the largest share, are likely to be proportional to the amount of land 
transacted. To keep matters tractable, we assume that households have the possibility of structuring rental 
contracts in a way that allows those lacking liquidity to enter into sharecropping or other arrangements that 
would allow them to defer rental payments until the harvest. With this, household i will choose l
a*, l
o*as well 
as A* by solving the maximization problem: 
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where p is the price of agricultural goods, l
o is the amount of time allocated to off-farm labor (l
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a
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in I is a indicator variable for rent-in (=1 for rent-in, and 0 otherwise), similarly 
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in and T
out are the transactions costs respectively associated with 




will solve the first order conditions (FOC) of problem (P), i.e. 
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The first order conditions allow derivation of three empirically testable propositions (see Deininger and Jin 
(2005) for a more detailed derivation) as follows:    9 
Proposition 1. The amount of land rented in is strictly increasing in ability, α , and strictly decreasing in the 
original land endowment  A . Other things constant, rental markets will thus transfer land to “land-poor but 
efficient” producers, causing large land owners and those with low agricultural ability to rent out to smaller 
ones while still enjoying the credit-market and potential non-monetary (status) advantages associated with 
land ownership. This is indeed consistent with what is observed in the literature (Sadoulet et al. 2001).  
Proposition 2. Rental restrictions as well as other types of transaction costs drive a wedge between those 
renting in and those renting out with any increase in T decreasing α l and increasing α u,
17 thereby expanding 
the range of producers who remain in autarky, reducing the number of households who are able to gain 
access to land by participating in rental markets, and decreasing the amount of land transacted through rental 
markets. Reduction in transaction cost will therefore increase social welfare.  
Proposition 3. Increases of the wage for off-farm employment will increase the supply of land to the rental 
market and thus the amount of land transacted in rental markets. This will result in a reduction of the rental 
rate and, in a risk-free environment this will make everybody better off.  
2.4 Estimation strategy  
According to equations 2a-2c, a household’s decision to enter land rental markets depends on their marginal 
productivity in autarky compared to the effective land rental, either the rental payment inclusive of state-
specific transaction costs r
in(T) for those renting in or the rental net of transaction costs r
out(T) for those 
renting out. In addition to agricultural ability (α ), the productivity impact of rental market participation will 
depend on the household’s endowment of land (A), family labor (L), assets (K), and the opportunity cost of 
labor which will be affected by the level of education (E) and the presence of opportunities in the local off-
farm labor market (O). Defining a well-behaved net earning function g( A , L, K, O) with first derivative g’() 
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This switching regime model is estimated using ordered probit with upper and lower thresholds being a 
function of tenure security and market development variables (Sadoulet et al. 1998). Transforming (8) into 
ordered probit model notation, we have:  
                         
17 We denote by α l ()and α u() the level of ability where households with given other characteristics switch from rent out land to autarky or from 
autarky to renting in land, respectively. In other words, households with α i < α l will rent out land, those with α i > α u rent in, and those with α u>α i< α l 
stay autarky. We can solve for α u, and α l jointly with 
a
i l  from the FOCs :
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We assume that the functions g’(α ,A,L,K,O), r
in(T) and r
out(T) are linear, allowing us to express them as: 
  g’(α ,A,L,K,O)= β 0  + β 1α  + β 2 A + β 3L + β 4K + β 5O 
r
in(T) = δ 0 + δ 1S       (5) 
 r
out(T) = η 0 +η 1S 
respectively. The ordered probit model is then estimated by maximum likelihood.  
A key element of the regression is households’ agricultural ability α. As the data available are a panel of 
households and their offspring who were observed in 1982 and again in 1999, one way of recovering this 
parameter would be to estimate a panel production function and then use household (dynasty) fixed effects 
as a proxy for ability (Deininger and Jin 2003). For a variety of reasons, including intergenerational 
transfers, the fact that a significant portion of cultivators had moved out of agriculture, and the expansion of 
the sample from about 4,000 to more than 7,000 households
18, such an approach would have involved the 
loss of a large number of observations. We therefore chose to estimate a stochastic frontier production 
function to determine producers’ level of technical efficiency in each of the periods. The stochastic frontier 
model assumes that the disturbance term is composed of two additive components, one that is pure white 
noise (vi), and a one-sided term (ui~ N
+(0, δ u
2)) that follows a truncated normal with zero mean 0 that 
captures producers’ level of technical inefficiency, t (Coelli 1995). Assuming a Cobb-Douglas functional 
form allows to write the model as  
qi =φ o  +φ  xi + ui - vi      (6) 
where qi is the logarithm of crop output obtained by household i, xi is a input vector including sown area, 
land, material inputs (i.e., fertilizer, seed, etc), fixed assets (all in logs), and household characteristics that 
may affect crop output, and φ  are the parameters to be estimated.  The technical efficiency variable TEi, 
defined as TEi = exp(-ui), can be predicted after estimating equation (6).  
Other household-level variables included in the ordered probit model (5) include a dummy for households 
who were landless at the time of the survey and the logarithm of the total land endowment to represent A, 
the number of members in the 14-60 and below 14-year age group to represent L, the total value of assets 
and the share of agricultural assets, defined to include livestock, implements, and structures directly useful 
for agricultural production to represent K, a dummy for whether the head has primary or above education 
                         
18 Of 4981 households who were included in the 1982 sample, 3880 could be retrieved in the 1999 round; 2697 who continued under the same head 
and 1183 who had split up. Replacements for households who had dropped out together with multiple ones who had emerged from the plit ones 
resulted in a total sample size of 7474 households in 1999.    11
and the head’s age as a proxy of experience to represent human capital E, and the mean level of village 
income to represent wage labor opportunities in the local off-farm labor market O.  
According to proposition 1, land rental markets would transfer land to more productive producers with 
lower land endowments and high levels of labor leading us to expect β 1> 0, β 2 < 0, β 3> 0. A positive sign on 
the element of β 4 that correspond to assets would point towards wealth bias in rental markets, possibly 
caused by credit market imperfections. Based on proposition three, we expect households whose past 
experience in off-farm labor markets reflects greater opportunities for such employment to be less likely to 
rent in and more likely to rent out and the level of rental market activity in general to increase with 
development of the off-farm economy, a variable that is represented empirically by the share of income 
derived from non-agricultural sources. We thus expect β 5 to be negative and the coefficient on the share of 
village income from agriculture to be positive ***. 
In addition to the above variables, a key focus of our analysis is on assessing the impact of exogenous 
restrictions on land market performance and households’ land market participation (proposition 2). We do so 
by having policy variables that will have an impact on T -which are represented by implementation of 
restrictions and number of tenancy laws as explained earlier- affect the lower and upper thresholds δ  and η  
in (5). Beyond these, we allow thresholds to vary over time to allow that overall economic development will 
systematically shift supply or demand of land in the rental market, and the household’s caste status as a 
proxy for the ability to find out about land on offer in the local market and to enforce contracts.  
3. Data sources and descriptive evidence 
Before discussing econometric results, we highlight some salient features of India’s rural economy by 
presenting evidence on socio-economic characteristics as well as land market participation and changes in 
these variables over time. This allows us to explore changes of the economic structure, growth, and asset 
accumulation by individuals and at the village level. Concerning rental markets, our interest is to find out 
whether our hypotheses are supported by descriptive evidence, or whether, possibly as a result of “reverse 
tenancy” rental markets lead to transfers from small to larger producers rather than to land-poor ones.  
3.1 Household characteristics  
The data used in the analysis come from two rounds of NCAER’s ARIS/REDS survey that were conducted 
in 1982 and 1999, respectively. This survey, the first rounds of which were implemented in 1968-71 to 
evaluate the impact of an agricultural development program, covers all of India’s major states. Even though 
the first round sample, which is stratified by farm size and wealth class, was limited to project areas, the 
survey was significantly expanded in 1982 to make it more representative at the national level, covering 
slightly less than 5,000 households (Foster and Rosenzweig 1996). The 1999 sample contains all of the 
households included in 1982 as well as replacements for those who were no longer present. If the original   12
household had split, all of the households belonging to the same dynasty in the original village plus a sub-
sample of successor households outside the village were interviewed, bringing the total to about 7,500 
households (Foster and Rosenzweig 2004).  
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the whole country and its four main regions in both periods.
19 We 
note that there has been a marked increase in educational attainment, as illustrated by the fact that the share 
of household heads who had at least primary schooling completed increased from about 26% in 1982 to 50% 
in 1999. Also the gap that had earlier separated Northern and Southern states has narrowed considerably. At 
the same time, population growth has led to a decline in the average land endowment, from 3.3 ha in 1982 to 
2.1 ha in 1999, and a small increase in landlessness, from 22% to 24%. The size of the average household 
decreased, from 6.9 to 6.0, with about 4 in the 14 to 60 age category, 0.4 aged above 60, and 2.4 as 
compared to 1.8 below the age of 14. The share of female headed households is, with 6.8%, almost the same 
in both periods, although female headship is more pronounced in the South than in other regions.  
Survey results also point towards an annual increase of per capita income of 3.08% during the period under 
concern. This aggregate masks pronounced differences across regions with the South having caught up and 
even replaced the North as the region with the highest income in the second period. Use of the information 
from the listing exercise allows us to compute the Gini coefficient for self-assessed income in a way that 
includes all households in the sampled villages. Doing so highlights that, with a Gini coefficient of 0.32 in 
the first and 0.31 in the second period, inequalities in income remain modest and have not appreciably 
increased between the two periods. The overall improvement in living standards as illustrated by increased 
income is mirrored by a significant rise in asset values of approximately 6% per year.
20 It is worth noting 
that, with a Gini coefficient of 0.60 in 1982, inequality in assets is higher than income inequality as is found 
in other parts in the world. However, this coefficient has actually decreased to 0.56 in the second period. 
While overall asset endowments have increased, the broad composition of households’ asset portfolio shows 
greater stability; the house and consumption durables make up the largest share in both periods (57.5% and 
56.9%, respectively in 1982 and 1999), followed by financial and off-farm assets (26.7% and 23.2%), and 
farm assets including livestock (15.8% and 19.9%).  
The bottom panel illustrates the diversification of livelihood sources achieved during the period by 
highlighting the share of households who participated in various activities, noting that households generally 
rely on more than just one income source. Three observations are of particular interest. First, despite a drop 
by about 7 and 15 points in the share of households engaging in crop and livestock production, respectively 
(from 70% to 63% for crop and from 78% to 63% for livestock), self employment in agriculture continues to 
constitute the single most important source of employment in India’s rural economy. The fact that this is 
                         
19 We group states into four regions as follows: The North includes the states of Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, and Uttar Pradesh; the West 
includes Gujarat, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan; the East includes Assam, Bihar, Orissa, and West Bengal; and the South includes 
Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu.  
20 While part of this increase may be due to improvements in the survey instrument that resulted in better measurement of assets in the second period, 
it is impossible to test this hypothesis as disaggregated data for 1982 were not available.    13
followed by agricultural wage employment, the share of which has actually increased over the period (from 
37.6% to 43.3%) illustrates the continued importance of agriculture. As wage employment is one of the few 
sources of livelihood open to the landless, agriculture is particularly relevant for the poor. A second finding 
of interest is that the share of households engaging in self-employment in rural India has been more or less 
constant, implying that growth of the rural non-farm sector has been just large enough to absorb population 
growth. This contrasts with other countries where the rural non-farm economy develops largely as a result of 
households taking up non-farm self employment (Lanjouw and Lanjouw 2001). In fact, according to our 
data, the main source of income diversification was the growth of non-farm wage employment, participation 
in which increased from 8.6% in 1982 to 20% in 1999. This can be explained as a result of the government’s 
emphasis on creating rural employment through a plethora of mechanisms that range from direct subsidies 
for firms setting up in remote areas to industrial and labor market regulation such as small scale reservation 
acts, as described and analyzed in recent contributions to the literature (Besley and Burgess 2004).  
3.2 Operation of land markets  
To provide evidence on the extent to which our hypotheses on land markets are borne out descriptively, 
table 3 presents the above variables for households disaggregated by their land rental market participation 
(rent in, rent out, or autarky). The table points towards a large increase in the level of land market activity 
over the period; from 5.3% and 2% for renting out and renting in in 1982, the share of market participants 
has increased to 10.7% and 4.1%, respectively, in 1999. While this is a large change, the level of rental 
market activity increased more rapidly, and in a shorter period, in other Asian countries such as China or 
Vietnam, despite the fact that the more egalitarian land ownership distribution in these countries would put 
greater limits on the potential of land markets to equalize operational holdings than in India.
21 Exploring 
econometrically the extent to which the impact of factors such as lower non-farm growth, landlessness, and 
land reform policies, affected the scope for land markets to improve land access and allocative efficiency 
will be of interest.  
Descriptive figures support the propositions from our model and point towards improved rental market 
functioning in the second, as compared to the first period. The first panel illustrates that in both periods 
rental provided an opportunity for relatively land-scarce and labor-abundant households to gain access to 
land as evident from comparing the per capita land endowment for land owners who are autarkic (0.51 ha 
and 0.36 ha in 1982 and 1999), rent-in (0.28 ha and 0.20 ha), or rent-out (0.68 ha and 0.64 ha) in the two 
periods. Land markets can be seen to have transferred land from households whose head is more educated 
and female headed to male headed ones with educational lower attainment. We also note that the share of 
landless who had gained access to land through rental markets increased from 12% in the first to 37% in the 
second period, suggesting a marked increase of outreach towards this group over time. Noting that our 
                         
21 In Vietnam, the shrae of households renting in increased form 3.8% to 15.8% in the 5-year period between 1993 and 1998 (Deininger and Jin 
2003). In China, the same figure increased from 2.3% in 1996 to 9.4 in 2001 (Deininger and Jin 2005).    14
sample represents a total rural population in India of about 130 mn, this suggests that in 1999 about 15 mn 
households -a quarter of them landless- were able to use markets as a means to get access to land. It is worth 
noting not only that this figure is much larger than the number of households who got access to land through 
land reform but also that, given the magnitudes involved, even policies that have only a “modest” impact on 
the functioning of land rental markets, could have implications for a large number of households.  
Comparing levels of consumption and assets for households who differ in the nature of their land market 
participation reinforces the notion that rental provided opportunities for poor segments of the population to 
access productive resources and thereby improve their well-being, especially in the second period. The value 
of all assets owned by rent-in households in 1999 is, with Rs. 33,839, more than 25% below the average, 
compared to asset ownership that is similar to the mean for autarkic households and about 33% higher than 
the mean for those renting out, supporting the notion that it is the asset-poor who benefit from the access to 
land which rental markets provide. The narrowing of the gap between rent-in and average households with 
respect to per capita expenditure supports the hypothesis of land markets making a positive contribution to 
the livelihood of participants. Finding significant differences in the composition of the asset portfolio 
between rent-in and rent-out households, with the former having relatively more of their wealth in farming 
and livestock and the latter in off-farm and financial assets is not too surprising.  
While higher rates of participation in crop and livestock production by rent-in households should not come 
as a surprise, the high share of rent-in households engaging in (agricultural) wage employment suggests that 
land rental provides opportunities for earning additional income to wage laborers, consistent with earlier 
evidence. At the same time, the fact that, contrary to what was found in 1982, non-farm self employment is 
significantly higher among rent-in households than the mean (or autarkic ones) suggests that land rental is 
not an obstacle to participation in the rural non-farm economy. To the contrary, renting may provide an 
opportunity to accumulate experience and capital to replace the “agricultural ladder” (Spillman 1919) with a 
general increase in occupational mobility including the non-farm sector (Alston and Ferrie 2005).  
4. Econometric evidence  
Consistent with descriptive evidence, results from production function and rental participation equations 
point towards the importance of land as a factor of production, suggesting that households with larger family 
labor endowments and less non-farm involvement will use rental markets as an avenue to access land. We 
also find that measures to effect land reform, whether proxied by the number of laws passed, the area 
transferred under ceiling legislation, or the number of beneficiaries from tenancy acts, constrain rental 
market activity, thereby reducing both equity and efficiency. They make it more difficult for producers with 
high ability, including the landless, to gain access to land while at the same time constituting an obstacle for 
giving up farming by those with low ability who want to get out of agriculture.  
4.1 Production function    15
As discussed earlier, a panel approach to recovering to recover a measure of households’ (or dynasties’) 
agricultural ability would have required dropping households or dynasties for whom production is observed 
only in one of the periods, either because they entered the sample in 1999 as a replacement for an earlier 
household or because they moved out of agriculture during the 20-year period that separates the two 
surveys.
22 To avoid this, we rely on a frontier production function in both periods and, in cases where a 
household’s production is observed only in one period, assume that the level of ability is time-invariant.
23  
Appendix table 1 contains descriptive statistics for the variables included in the production function in both 
periods while table 2 reports results from estimating the Cobb-Douglass production functions for output, 
based on value of production from the 40 most important commodities,
24 using OLS and a frontier approach. 
re presented in appendix table 2. production function estimation for a each of the two time periods. High 
values of the R
2 for the OLS regressions points towards a very good fit. Coefficient estimates from the 
maximum likelihood estimation of the Cobb-Douglas stochastic production frontier are similar to those 
obtained by OLS. Concerning the individual variables, land is estimated to be by far the most important 
input to crop production; doubling cultivated land area alone would lead to an almost 50% increase in total 
crop production. This is followed by labor with an estimated elasticity between 18.8% and 20.8.%.. 
Compared to these two variables, returns to labor are estimated to be more moderate with elasticities of 
about 5%, 4%, 2.5%, and 2.3% for fertilizer, assets, other, and pesticide expenditures. While neither 
education nor the gender of the household head are significant, having all of the farm area under irrigation is 
estimated to increase output by between 31.5% and 34.2%. Figure 1 presents predicted technical efficiency, 
TEi=exp(-ui), the measure we use to represent production ability, in histogram form. The fact that ability 
varies considerably between households could imply that, even without a strong pull from non-agricultural 
employment opportunities as in the case of China, the scope for market-mediated transfers to bring about 
efficiency gains could be large.   
4.2 Determinants of land market participation  
Results from ordered probit estimation of the rental market participation equation on the pooled sample for 
1982 and 1999 as reported in table 4 provide insights on the factors affecting rental market participation as 
well as the impact of rental market restrictions. For the latter, we use three measures and, for each of them, 
present equations with and without producers’ estimated ability to ensure that results do not dependent on 
inclusion of this measure. While regressions without ability (columns 1, 3 and 5) include the whole sample, 
                         
22 In fact, our sample suggests that it was households with higher productivity who left the agricultural sector and that the difference in the level of 
productivity between this group and those who remained in agriculture is statistically significant. .  
23 For the subset of households that were observed in both periods, we estimated 1999 ability from estimating production frontier using 1999 data and 
1982 ability using 1982 data.  The pairwise correlation between the 1999 and 1982 abilities is 0.70, significant at 1% level., which supports the 
assumption that dynasties’a agricultural ability is indeed quite time-invariant. 
24 These commodities include paddy, wheat, barley, maize, jowar, bajra, ragi, pulses, small millets, groundnut and other oilseeds, cotton, jute and 
other fibre crops, sugarcane and other sugar and starch crops.   16
the fact that ability is defined only for households or dynasties who engaged in agricultural production in 
either of the periods reduces the sample by about 2,500 observations while not altering substantive results.
25   
Factor affecting participation on either the supply- or demand-side of the rental market as indicated from the 
main equation are consistent with our hypothesis (recall the coding convention of 1 for renting out, 2 for 
autarky, and 3 for renting in). In particular, as proposition 1 and descriptive statistics led us to expect, land 
rental provides an important opportunity for landless households to gain access to land. One indication for 
this is the significance and magnitude of the coefficient on the landless dummy. Furthermore, higher land 
endowments are estimated to increase households’ propensity to supply land to the rental market while 
higher endowments with family labor, especially of members in the 14-60 year age group, increase the 
propensity to rent in land. This supports the notion that, by transferring land to those with higher 
endowments of family labor, markets will improve the scope for gainful employment of labor in rural areas. 
To interpret the regression coefficients, note that the probability for a landless household to gain access to 
land through rental is 4.1 to 7.4 percentage points higher than of those who are endowed with land. At the 
same time, the propensity to supply land of the largest land owners in our sample is between 26.8 and 40.3 
points higher than that of a landless household.  
Contrary to widespread belief which assumes that markets will favor those with higher levels of wealth, the 
lack of significance of households’ total asset ownership suggests that, consistent with descriptive statistics, 
land rental markets are not biased against the poor. However, the composition of households’ asset portfolio 
does matter; the significant coefficient on the share of non-farm assets highlights that those with a higher 
share of their assets in agriculture will be more likely to rent in land. Compared to those with no off-farm 
assets at all, those who initially had all the assets related to off-farm activities is more than 25% more likely 
to rent out their land.  
The results also suggest that higher levels of education, measured by whether the head has completed at 
least primary education, significantly increase the propensity to supply land to rental market due to higher 
opportunity cost of labor for more educated individuals (proposition 2 and 3). The probability to rent out 
(rent in) land for a household whose head attained primary education or above is 2.3% higher (1% lower) 
than one without such education. Mean village income similarly increases the tendency to rent out, implying 
that as, with overall development, the level of income increases, households will be more likely to move out 
of agriculture and supply their land to the rental market, thereby allowing those with higher levels of 
agricultural ability to increase their holdings and income levels, as also observed in China (Deininger et al. 
2005). Compared to villages in the lowest income decile, those in the highest are 4-5 percentage points more 
likely to supply land to the rental market. This would imply that the importance of land rental markets will 
increase with overall economic development and that imposing exogenous restrictions on the operation of 
                         
25 There are 4,346 observations in the 1982 and 7,476 in the 1999 survey, 491 of which lack information on village income, yielding 11,331 ones that 
can be used in the regression. Columns 2, 4 and 6 include 2,889 producer households from 1982 who split into 4,605 in 1999, in addition to 1419 
ones who were added in the second period, excluding 93 for whom no village level income was available.    17
such markets could have far-reaching implications and may inflict efficiency losses the magnitude of which 
increases over time.  
The highly significant coefficient on ability also supports our hypothesis of rental markets transferring land 
from less to more efficient producers. To illustrate, the probability of the most efficient household in the 
sample to receive land is about 4 percentage points higher than that for the least efficient producer while the 
least efficient producer is about 7 percentage points more likely to rent out than the most efficient one. This 
points towards the potential for land transfers through rental markets to significantly enhances efficiency. 
Regarding the lower bound equation, the regressions suggest that the three different measures used to 
represent land market restrictions (labeled as “policy variable”) are associated with a significant and 
quantitatively important reduction of supply of land to the rental market.
26 This is in line with our discussion 
suggesting that landlords will be less ready to rent out their land if regulations either imply that part or all of 
their property rights to land that is rented out may be lost or limit their ability to freely negotiate the amount 
of rent to be paid. This result is obtained irrespectively of the variable chosen to empirically represent policy 
although comparing the coefficients on policy measures across specifications suggests that the number of 
laws passed had the least impact, followed by the implementation of ceiling laws and the implementation of 
tenancy legislation. This is consistent with the notion that ceiling laws pose less of a threat than tenancy 
regulation, both because the latter apply to all market participants irrespectively of the size of their holding -
in contrast to ceiling legislation which is applicable only to large owners- and because enforcement of 
tenancy regulation is less politically controversial and administratively complex than that of land ceilings.  
Coefficients on other variables in the lower bound equation suggest that, even after adjusting for the factors 
discussed earlier, scheduled castes and tribes as well as other backward castes are less likely to rent out land 
than the remainder of the population, a finding that may be related to lower levels of social capital and thus 
either less opportunity to find partners in rental markets or to enforce protection of property rights for land 
that had been rented out. At the same time, the highly significant coefficient on 1999 dummy illustrates that, 
over and above the activation of land rental markets that comes about as a result of increases in village 
income, the supply of land to rental markets has increased significantly over time.  
Turning to the (upper) bound between autarky and renting in, the fact that estimates for all of the policy 
variables are positive suggests that such measures not only reduced supply (as indicated by the lower bound 
equation) but also depressed demand and made it more difficult for households to obtain land through rental 
markets. Across specifications, the level of significance is much higher for variables relating to the intensity 
of enforcement; in fact the number of laws, while of the expected sign, is not significantly different from 
zero at conventional levels, suggesting that such legislation affects market outcomes only if measures are 
taken to implement it, consistent with what has been observed in the literature (Banerjee et al. 2002). The 
                         
26 To interpret the coefficients in the lower bound equation marking  the transition form renting out to autarky, note that a positive coefficient implies 
expansion of the rent-out regime and better functioning of rental markets while a negative coefficient suggests the opposite.   18
magnitude of the coefficients which can be interpreted as a rough measure of the difference in impact 
between tenancy and ceiling legislation is similar to what had been observed for the lower bound, suggesting 
that these variables have contributed to a roughly equal expansion of supply and demand in the rental 
market. Parallel to what emerged for the lower bound, we find that backward and scheduled castes and tribes 
are more likely to remain in autarky. Over time the size of the autarky area has decreased, i.e. land rental 
markets have become more active, partly offsetting the negative impact of rental regulation. While this is an 
encouraging sign, one should note that, given the magnitude of the coefficients, almost a century will be 
required for the time trend to fully offset the impact of tenancy legislation. This, together with evidence that 
circumventing such legislation is normally easier for the rich than the poor (Thangaraj 1995, Yugandhar 
1996) would imply that expecting the passage of time alone to eliminate the negative effect of tenancy 
regulation is unlikely to be a realistic policy option.  
4.3 Equity and efficiency impact of land reform policy  
The above provides strong support for the hypothesis that different forms of land rental legislation have 
reduced activity in land rental markets and constrained the ability of the poor and landless to acquire land 
that would help them to improve their income and social status. At the same time, many scholars argue that 
tenancy regulations can still be socially desirable because of an underlying trade-off between equity and 
efficiency. Under this interpretation, the equity and social gains they bring about would, at least for some 
welfare weights, more than outweigh the associated efficiency losses (Besley et al. 2004). More importantly, 
the equity and efficiency-impact of land reform legislation can be obtained from the signs of appropriate 
coefficients in an expanded version of the ordered probit regression (6) where the policy coefficient T is 
interacted with a dummy for landlessness or the level of productive efficiency as obtained from the frontier 
production function discussed earlier.
27 Inclusion of producers’ initial level of productivity requires little 
justification and the focus on landless households is motivated by equity concerns, in particular the apparent 
high production elasticity of land and the presumption that gaining access to land will be associated with a 
qualitative and discrete increase in economic opportunities and social status (Finan et al. 2005).  
Results from three specifications of the ordered probit equation that interact the level of tenancy restrictions 
with landlessness, efficiency, and both (in columns 1, 2, and 3, respectively), are reported in table 5. While it 
is not surprising to find that the coefficients in the main equation are broadly consistent with those in table 4, 
a number of additional insights are of interest. As to possible equity impacts, inspection of the upper bound 
equation suggests that the main impact of tenancy regulation on the demand side is to prevent access to land 
by the landless (column 1) and more efficient producers (column 2); in fact after accounting for both these 
effects, the coefficient on the policy variable by itself is negative and highly significant. One explanation 
consistent with this finding is that sitting tenants who already own land but are not necessarily the most 
                         
27 As landless households will obviously not be able to supply land to the rental market, the interaction between landlessness and the policy variable 
is included only in the upper bound equation.    19
efficient producers
28 benefit from tenancy regulation at the cost of landless and more productive producers 
are constrained by the transaction costs imposed through tenancy restrictions and unable to effectively 
express their demand in the market.  
Concerning the impact of tenancy restrictions on efficiency, the upper bound equation suggests that, in 
addition to rationing out efficient producers on the demand side, and contrary to what is intended, tenancy 
regulations encourage more efficient producers to supply their land to the rental market, possibly because 
they are in a better position to sidestep the transaction costs imposed by this intervention. Instead, possibly 
because tenancy restrictions make it more difficult for them to gain access to additional land that would 
allow to make best use of their skills, producers with high levels of ability are estimated to supply land to the 
rental market. This suggests that tenancy restrictions can make the economy worse off and that the gains 
associated with their removal should be more than sufficient to compensate possible losers and ensure that 
reforms are Pareto-improving. Comparing the coefficient for the policy variable and its interaction with 
ability between columns 1 and 2 or 3, respectively, suggests that, in states where tenancy restrictions are 
prevalent, producers with low levels of ability are less likely to rent out their land. This would imply that, 
where such restrictions exist, possible efficiency gains from low-ability producers moving out of agriculture 
and making their land available to those with higher levels of ability will are less likely to materialize.  
4.4 Exploring variation over time  
A key argument to justify adoption of rental regulations when they were first introduced was that presence 
of multiple market imperfections in rural areas, exacerbated by immobility of land, would allow landlords to 
extract large rents from tenants who lack alternative opportunities. Comparing tenants’ returns from 
cultivating rented land per day of family labor spent, net of any cash or kind outlays for inputs and the rental 
payment, for tenants with the prevailing agricultural wage rate provides a simple way of assessing the extent 
to which participation in rental markets can help to improve overall welfare. Doing so with the data at hand 
highlights the potentially far-reaching and positive impact of rental markets; even after deducting the rental 
fee (in cash or kind) from the net return per day of R 150 which is very close to the value marginal product 
of family labor from a Cobb-Douglas production function {jin nagarajan}, the average tenant earns more 
than double the wage rate for agricultural labor (46.4 for men and 33.7 for women) for every day spent on 
rented-in land. Although unobserved differences in ability could play a role, anecdotal evidence these are 
unlikely to be sufficient to explain such large differences. In view of the fact that wages for women are 
significantly lower than those for men, the potential for rental markets to contribute economically empower 
women is particularly noteworthy and in line with anecdotal evidence suggesting that women are among the 
most avid users of programs aiming to make land available for rental, either on an individual or on a group 
basis, {sc/st evaluation}.  
                         
28 Especially when they become old and their children do not want to continue in farming as was found to be the case in the Philippines (Deininger et 
al. 2002).    20
An explanation that is consistent with the above evidence is that, with economic development and greater 
availability of non-agricultural employment options, the impact of other markets imperfections (e.g. barriers 
to credit market access) may have become less pronounced over time, a possibility that has indeed been 
discussed at a theoretical level in the literature (Mookherjee 1997). While lack of wage rates in 1982 
prevents us from directly examining how this gap has evolved over time, we use an econometric approach to 
empirically test for this. In particular, probit regressions for renting in and renting out where most of the 
coefficients included earlier are interacted with a time dummy allows us to test for the extent to which the 
structure of land access through rental markets has changed over time, and whether this would reduce or 
even obviate the need for tight regulation of such markets that may have been justified earlier.  
Results from doing so (table 6) suggest that there have indeed been structural changes in the almost 20 years 
separating our two surveys. Results from tests for the hypothesis that the value of one of the time-varying 
coefficients equaled zero in 1999 are reported in the bottom panel. Most importantly, a significant wealth-
bias in the ability to access land -which may have been the result of capital market imperfections- that was 
present in the first period is no longer discernible in 1999. While in 1982 households with higher levels of 
assets were more likely to access land through rental markets (see the positive sign of γ1 in table 6), this had 
been reversed in the second period as we can no longer reject the hypothesis of no wealth effect, i.e. γ1 + γ2 = 
0 as indicated in the bottom of table 6 and consistent with the findings from earlier regressions. While more 
detailed investigation of the factors underlying this results transcends the scope of this paper, one 
explanation consistent with this finding would be that supply of land as well a the ability of potential renters 
to access (formal or informal) credit markets have increased in the course of economic development. This 
interpretation is consistent with the elimination of a similar, albeit slightly less significant bias of land rental 
markets in favor of more educated individuals between the first and the second period (δ1 and δ2 in table 6). 
It is also of interest to observe that, while the propensity of large land owners to rent in, which was already 
negative in the initial period (β1) has further decreased and that in villages with higher levels of income, the 
demand for land rental is now significantly lower than it was earlier, both factors presumably due to better 
availability of non-agricultural opportunities. This suggests that, at least in the areas represented by our 
sample, concerns about a trend towards reverse tenancy that could undermine livelihood options for the 
poorest are not justified. At the same time, we note that the strong advantage which landless had enjoyed in 
the land rental market has decreased slightly, an issue that would be worth to be further explored. On the 
supply side, we note that the propensity of large land owners to supply land to the rental market also has 
increased significantly between the two periods, implying that, instead of encountering transactions between 
small land owners that have little impact on the agrarian structure, one will be more likely to find exchanges 
of land that modify the structure of operational land holdings.  
5. Conclusion and policy implications   21
In rural India, there is an increasing recognition of the importance of land rental markets to bring land to 
more productive uses while at the same time providing a basis for development of the rural non-farm 
economy. Even though the presence of numerous restrictions on the operation of land rental markets in the 
case of India makes this of even greater interest, cross-state evidence on this issue has thus far been limited. 
By using a national sample, we are able to provide such evidence.  
We find that, contrary to what is often assumed, land rental markets help to improve not only productivity 
but also equity. They do so by allowing landless and land-poor households to access land and improve their 
livelihood. More importantly, the pro-poor nature of land markets has significantly improved over time as 
wealth bias that had characterized such markets earlier has been eliminated. The fact that land markets are 
more active in locations with higher levels of non-farm activity supports the notion that such markets make 
an increasingly important contribution to diversification of livelihoods in rural areas. In fact, higher 
incidence of opportunities and options open through such diversification could be a key factor underlying 
the elimination of wealth-related barriers to land rental market participation. At the same time, the finding 
that presence of tenancy laws and ceiling legislation, as well as high levels of implementation of these, 
reduce rather than increase land access by the landless and possibly very efficient producers is cause for 
concern. It suggests that, while such laws may have led to significant social gains in the past, their 
maintenance does no longer have a positive impact on equity but instead is developing into an increasingly 
potent obstacle to land access and greater productivity. Our findings provide an empirical underpinning to 
support the desirability of eliminating land rental market restrictions that is articulated in the Government’s 
most recent 5-year plan (Government of India 2002).
29 In fact, by demonstrating the significance and 
magnitude of these impacts quantitatively, our results reinforce the importance of moving from policy 
principles towards action on this issue.  
While our sample is too small (and the survey too general) to provide specific guidance on how to move the 
debate from the “whether” to the “how” of reform, our results, together with the literature, provide two 
pointers. The literature suggests that sitting tenants are the main beneficiaries from tenancy regulation or 
other rental restrictions -and thus stand to lose most from reform. In fact, elimination of rent controls on 
rural lands without protection of sitting tenants in Egypt seems to have been associated with undesirable 
consequences (Bush 2000). Ways to compensate tenants who have been on the same plot for a long time 
will increase the likelihood that reforms be feasible politically. This could include innovative mechanisms to 
clarify overlapping property rights to land reform land as experimented with in some Indian states (Hanstad 
and Nielsen 2004). On the other hand, many Indian scholars contend that liberalization of rental markets 
should be complemented by strong further regulation that would, for example, limit the amount of land that 
can be rented in by a producer (Saxena 2002). The evidence that land rental markets increasingly transfer 
                         
29 “…freedom in leasing of land, both 'leasing in' and 'leasing out' will help generate income for both lessee and lessor/contractor. A legislation needs 
to be enacted to facilitate the land utilisation by making land transactions easier and facilitating leasing and contract farming.” (Government of India 
2002, p. 528).    22
land towards the land-poor that emerges from our analysis suggests that there may be no need for such 
regulation. To the contrary, experience in other countries suggests that such regulation is difficult to enforce 
and, by creating incentives for discretionary interference by bureaucrats, impose considerable transaction 
costs (Zepeda 2000) and the need for it should be evaluated very carefully. Opening up of land leasing 
markets in India has the potential to generate significant benefits for the rural poor and it would be a pity if 
these gains were jeopardized by a tendency of low-level bureaucrats to use well-intended regulation a 
pretext for discretionary use of their power.    23























Andra Pradesh  17.11  75.73  0.75%  8.34%  0.53 
Bihar 
a 22.22  82.88  0.00%  4.42%  2.64 
Gujarat 8.44  50.60  11.20%  1.95%  1.47 
Haryana 10.60  21.08  0.01%  1.26%  0.00 
Himachal Pradesh  2.08  6.08  3.19%  0.06%  n.a. 
Karnataka 18.79  52.73  5.29%  1.71%  1.42 
Kerala 0.94  31.84  12.49%  1.30%  2.42 
Madhya Pradesh  43.75  60.39  0.61%  2.69%  0.94 
Maharashtra 33.54  96.75  10.68%  7.74%  0.97 
Orissa 13.54  36.71  1.43%  2.24%  1.94 
Punjab 
b 15.45  24.29  0.04%  1.50%  0.58 
Rajasthan 27.04  56.47  0.16%  6.63%  0.00 
Tamil Nadu  10.12  62.11  3.23%  2.47%  4.03 
Uttar Pradesh  51.17  166.05  0.00%  5.81%  1.42 
West Bengal  16.98  80.22  10.80%  14.91%  3.83 
All India  298.77  930.57  5.35%  4.41%  1.49 
Source: Kaushik and Haque (2005), based on annual reports by the Ministry of Rural Development for columns 1-4; Besley and 
Burgess (2000) for coloumn 5.  
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Table 2: Key household characteristics by region and time.  
 1982  1999 
  All  North West  East South  All   North West  East South 
Basic characteristics 
Household  size  6.86 7.20 7.28 6.97 6.01 6.02 6.64 6.10 6.30 5.21 
Members aged below 14  2.36  2.58  2.61  2.36 1.87 1.86 2.15 2.02 1.93 1.36 
Members  aged  14  –  60  4.16 4.22 4.35 4.28 3.83 3.75 4.01 3.68 4.02 3.44 
Members older than 60  0.34  0.41  0.32  0.33 0.32 0.41 0.48 0.40 0.36 0.41 
Head's  age  50.10 51.52 49.59 48.89 49.96 49.20 49.45 48.55 48.43 50.30 
Female  head  dummy  (%)  6.86 4.14 4.39 4.63  13.29  6.66 4.28 5.14 4.65  11.89 
Head with primary or above.  0.26 0.22 0.17 0.26 0.40 0.50 0.56 0.42 0.54 0.51 
Land endowment (ha)  3.29  2.65  4.78  2.31 2.52 2.12 1.99 2.82 1.29 1.86 
Land endowment p.c.  0.52  0.42  0.72  0.36 0.42 0.39 0.35 0.52 0.24 0.37 
Landless  dummy  (%)  22.28 22.43 18.78 20.30 27.02 23.93 27.16 21.10 23.41 25.03 
Consumption and asset ownership            
Per  capita  income    1538.62 1915.45 1470.32 1226.49 1424.24 2595.59 2994.16 2125.07 1979.44 3246.56 
Per  capita  consumption  exp.  1305 1506 1200 1058 1362 1561 1803 1526 1287 1579 
Gini  (per  capita  cons.  exp.)  0.32 0.30 0.29 0.31 0.36 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.36 0.28 
Value  of  all  assets    (Rs.)  17710 24654 17947 10170 14743 47749 66529 43810 29298 48688 
Financial  and  off-farm  (%) 26.69 25.73 29.56 28.30 23.62 23.21 18.56 19.87 25.14 31.66 
Farming  and  livestock  (%) 15.81  16.69  20.67 7.16 10.58  19.86  23.53  26.27 8.08 13.01 
House  &  cons.  durables  (%)  57.50 57.58 49.79 64.54 65.79 56.93 57.91 53.86 66.78 55.33 
Gini  (all  assets  per  capita)  0.60 0.54 0.56 0.55 0.64 0.56 0.55 0.53 0.59 0.54 
Participation in economic activities (%)          
Crop  production    70.24 68.57 75.64 71.49 65.07 62.89 67.45 68.41 61.29 53.15 
Livestock  production    78.11 81.31 87.35 66.27 70.36 62.85 72.90 66.88 55.16 54.26 
Non-farm  self-employment    11.33 10.63 11.16 13.13 11.22 10.96  7.86  10.77 20.73  7.41 
Salaried  employment    17.47 24.71 12.65 22.24 14.18 17.27 27.33 13.59 16.22 13.90 
Off-farm wage employment   8.59  5.63  11.10 10.15  7.62  19.96 17.01 18.48 32.36 16.17 
Wage  employment    37.59 21.27 39.49 42.69 47.71 43.29 28.27 44.98 53.94 47.05 
No.  of  observation  4980 1279 1613  670  1417 7476 1705 2479 1307 1985 
Source: Own computation from 1982 and 1999 ARIS/REDS surveys 
All values are in 1982 Rs with 1999 values having been deflated by state level deflators.  
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Table 3:  Key household characteristics by rental market participation status (1982 and 1999) 
 1982  1999 
    Autarkic Rent-in Rent-out  Autarkic Rent-in Rent-out 
Basic Characteristics 
Household  size  6.92** 8.15** 5.34**  6.04  6.91** 5.54** 
Members aged below 14  2.38**  2.75  1.83**  1.87  2.38**  1.53** 
Members aged 14 – 60  4.20**  4.90**  3.10**  3.77  4.17**  3.45** 
Members older than 60  0.34**  0.49*  0.41  0.40**  0.36  0.56** 
Land endowment (ha)  3.34*  2.31*  2.93  2.02**  1.27**  2.87** 
Land  endowment  p.c.  0.51  0.28** 0.68** 0.36** 0.20** 0.64** 
Landless  dummy  (%)  23.76** 11.83*  0.00** 26.29**  37.34** 0.00** 
Head's age  49.97*  51.85  51.71  48.98**  47.41*  51.65** 
Female head dummy (%)  6.67*  2.15  12.03**  6.54  3.30*  8.90** 
Head with primary or above (%)  25.34**  29.03  35.71**  48.51**  49.50  61.53** 
Consumption and asset ownership        
Per capita consumption exp. (Rs.)  1280.42**  1426.98  1697.84**  1549.19**  1346.19**  2213.63** 
Value of all assets  (Rs)  17215**  34783**  20333  46568**  33839**  62466** 
Financial and off-farm (%)  26.47  19.48  34.20**  22.69*  19.23**  27.160** 
Farming and livestock (%)  15.70**  32.12**  7.69**  20.91**  21.67  13.26** 
House & cons. durables (%)  57.83  48.40  58.10  56.41  59.10*  59.58 
Participation in activities (%)   
Crop production   72.60** 100.00** 19.17**  66.12** 100.00** 23.07** 
Livestock  production    78.66*  97.85** 61.65** 63.57** 81.82** 49.88** 
Non-farm self-employment   11.30  5.38  13.91  9.9**  14.61*  17.96** 
Salaried employment   16.84**  18.28  28.2**  15.98**  10.71**  30.05** 
Wage employment   38.82**  26.88*  19.92**  44.93**  59.74**  23.94** 
Number of observations  4621  93  266  6366  308  802 
Source: Own computation from 1982 and 1999 ARIS/REDS surveys 
All values are in 1982 Rs with 1999 values having been deflated by state level deflators.   26
Table 4: Determinants of participation in land rental markets (ordered probit regression) 
  Policy measure in the upper/lower bound equations 
  Tenants recognized   Ceiling land redistributed  No. of tenancy laws 
Main equation        






























































































































Lower bound (rent out to autarky) 
















































Upper bound (autarky to rent in) 
















































Observations  11331 8820 11147 8820 11221 8711 
Log  likelihood  -4564.94 -3513.55 -4450.96 -3501.93 -4514.77 -3436.48 
Robust z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Constants and regional dummies included 
throughout but not reported.  
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Table 5:  Ordered probit regression interacting policy with efficiency and landlessness 
 Interaction  considered 
  Landlessness  Landlessness & Productivity 
Main equation    
Ability   0.384*** 
(3.35) 








































Lower bound (rent out to autarky)    




Tenancy rights*ability    32.764*** 
(2.60) 












Upper bound (autarky to rent in)     








Tenancy rights*ability    7.689 
(0.51) 












Observations 11331  8820 
Log likelihood  -4528.49  -3502.61 
Robust z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Constants and regional dummies included throughout but not reported.  
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Table 6: Determinants of rental market participation (probit results) 
  Type of participation 
  Renting in  Renting out 





























































































































































































Observations  11331  8820 8820 8660 7816 
Log  likelihood  -1542.80 -1363.31 -1360.98 -2695.67 -1956.37 
Tests:         
α 1 + α2=0  16.70*** 17.75*** 17.83*** 27.32*** 23.05*** 
β 1 + β2 = 0  1.35  1.40  1.55  26.38***  23.45*** 
γ1 + γ2 =  0  0.08 0.42 0.71 2.06 0.01 
δ 1 + δ2 = 0  2.07  2.37  2.39  23.42***  16.17*** 
ζ1 + ζ2 = 0  20.25***  15.06***  16.09***  4.51**  4.22** 
η1 + η2 =0 0.11  12.39***  12.67***  n.a.  n.a. 
Robust z statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Regional dummies included throughout but not 
reported. The reported test statistics for the joint tests in the bottom panel are χ
2 statistics.   29
 
Appendix Table 1:  Characteristics of crop production of rural India in 1982.  
 All  India  Regions 




Value  of  crop  production  22820.86  30739.11 21492.66 16301.58 20407.80 
Crop  area  (ha)  2.12  2.41 2.74 1.35 1.41 
Share of crop area irrigated  0.27  0.43  0.19  0.18  0.26 
Total labor in crop production (days)  472.19  419.40  449.48  437.17  571.43 
Seed  expenditure  (Rs.)  749.88  865.04 821.73 346.59 752.32 
Fertilizer  expenditure  (Rs.)  2161.45  3501.84 1506.81 1058.67 2330.39 
Pesticide expenditure (Rs.)  268.09  266.27  184.24  84.65  477.77 
Other expenditure (Rs.)  626.32  1163.98  462.11  258.02  523.41 
Total farming assets  (Rs.)  3504.22  5404.92  4520.87  649.34  1798.99 
Head’s  age    50.91  52.77 50.12 49.87 50.71 
Head attained primary education or higher   0.26  0.21  0.16  0.28  0.43 
Share of household with female head  0.05  0.02  0.03  0.03  0.10 




Value  of  crop  production  44434.29  61075.79 40082.64 25425.60 47803.93 
Crop  area  (ha)  2.54  2.78 3.11 1.61 1.99 
Share of crop area irrigated  0.63  0.92  0.55  0.56  0.51 
Total labor in crop production (days)  166.62  136.57  170.34  143.97  213.16 
Seed expenditure (Rs.)  2171.38  2086.84  2621.99  958.04  2455.94 
Fertilizer  expenditure  (Rs.)  3589.31  5359.63 3403.45 1806.13 3276.48 
Pesticide expenditure (Rs.)  730.25  1027.46  863.09  174.33  597.83 
Other expenditure (Rs.)  2335.45  3341.76  2751.46  950.65  1548.77 
Total farming assets  (Rs.)  45240.54  69732.29  50568.00  8318.05  36984.85 
Head’s  age    50.04  50.71 49.59 49.33 50.60 
Head attained primary education or higher   0.51  0.56  0.41  0.57  0.56 
Share of household with female head  0.05  0.04  0.04  0.04  0.08 
No. of observations  4,208  1,037  1,557  713  901 
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Appendix Table 2: Estimation of Cobb-Douglass crop production function (1982 data) 
 1982  1999 
 OLS  Frontier  OLS  Frontier 




































































































Observations 3328  3328  4208  4208 
R
2 or log-likelihood  0.77  -2721.08  0.87  -2284.66 
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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